This research tells that at the beginning of his book, Avery makes the point that one of the key issues which led to the victory of the Allies was the material advantage they had over the Germans. For instance, in 1943, the allies were able to produce 151,000 aircraft against the Germans 43,000 aircraft. This just shows how massive the difference was, and the situation was to be repeated in other areas of resource mobilization. Reading through the book, the insistence of the huge resource gap is repeated over and over. Even though the resources levels kept shifting between the two bases, the rearmament but the Americans coupled by the revival of the Soviet industry after the devastating defeat at the hands of the Germans, tipped this balance for good. Even though the author is keen not to draw a conclusion that the superior gap in terms of material supplies was not a major factor in winning the war, it has to be noted that this was a major factor. To begin with, the entry of the United States into the war and the rapid rejuvenation of the Soviets manufacturing after almost obliteration by the Germans between 1941-3, played a key role in defining the war in later years. For once, even Overy acknowledges that it reached a point where the production of tanks and aircraft by the Allies was several times more than that of the levels of the Axis. Basically, with huge resources at their disposal, the Allies were better placed to fight the war. However, the author is keen to stress that it will be fallacious to assume that resources alone were enough to tip the balance on the battlefield. He makes the assertion that there are many factors that could have canceled out the resources advantage such as the quality of weapons, application of weapons on the battlefield and the skills and courage of the soldiers.